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Abstract
Does cruel behavior towards robots lead to vice, whereas kind behavior does not lead to virtue? This paper presents a critical 
response to Sparrow’s argument that there is an asymmetry in the way we (should) think about virtue and robots. It discusses 
how much we should praise virtue as opposed to vice, how virtue relates to practical knowledge and wisdom, how much 
illusion is needed for it to be a barrier to virtue, the relation between virtue and consequences, the moral relevance of the 
reality requirement and the different ways one can deal with it, the risk of anthropocentric bias in this discussion, and the 
underlying epistemological assumptions and political questions. This response is not only relevant to Sparrow’s argument 
or to robot ethics but also touches upon central issues in virtue ethics.
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The virtue ethics argument against robot 
abuse and Sparrow’s argument 
for asymmetry with regard to virtue and vice
If someone kicks a robot, what is wrong with that? This is 
not a mere philosophical thought experiment; some peo-
ple’s reactions when robots are “abused” suggest that at least 
some people have the intuition that there is something wrong 
with “bad” behavior towards robots.1 But why, exactly, is it 
wrong? The robot cannot feel pain and, more generally, is 
not harmed in a sense we use when people are harmed. How 
can we justify this intuition?
Virtue theory can provide an account what might be 
wrong with “abusive” behavior towards robots: if it is 
wrong at all, it is so not because any properties of the robot, 
but because it leads to a bad moral character on the part 
of the human agent. A similar argument has been made by 
Kant, who famously said that we should not shoot a dog 
not because we have a direct duty towards it (they are not 
rational), but because it may lead to insensitivity to cruelty 
on the part of the human; therefore, we have an indirect duty 
towards the dog. (Kant, 1996) Such a Kantian argument has 
been used in ethics of human–robot interaction (Darling, 
2017) and in previous work, using the example of kick-
ing a robot, I have suggested to apply virtue ethics to the 
question concerning moral standing of robots (e.g. Coeck-
elbergh, 2016). Previously, virtue ethics arguments have 
also been used in thinking about violence in video games. 
(e.g. McCormick, 2001). The advantage of such virtue argu-
ments is that moral standing can be ascribed to robots with-
out making a consequentialist argument (making the claim 
that behaviour towards robots actually leads to bad behav-
iour towards humans) and without relying on the intrinsic 
properties of robots. While robots as we know them do not 
have properties such as sentience or other properties which 
we usually deem necessary for ascribing moral considera-
tion, we can nevertheless give them some moral considera-
tion on the basis of their impact on the moral character of 
human agents. It enables us to condemn “abusive” behaviour 
towards robots not because of any harm that would be done 
to the robot (there is no harm, as far as we know) but because 
it reflects badly on the moral character of the human agent.
Most of these discussion centre on bad behaviour and 
its implications for virtue. But what about kindness? Can 
being kind to robots lead to virtue? Cappuccio et al. (2020) 
have argued that robots offer human agents opportuni-
ties to cultivate both vices and virtues, stressing again the 
 * Mark Coeckelbergh 
 mark.coeckelbergh@univie.ac.at
1 Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna, Vienna, 
Austria
1 See for example https:// editi on. cnn. com/ 2015/ 02/ 13/ tech/ spot- 
robot- dog- google/ index. html.
 M. Coeckelbergh 
1 3
advantage of appealing to virtue ethics: one does not need to 
rely on the objective qualities or powers of the social robot. 
A long as the habitual behaviour has enough similarity to 
the habitual behaviour we train with regard to humans, the 
robot is expected to create virtue or vice on the part of the 
human. Picking up the same example of robot kicking and 
drawing on his previous work on robots and virtue (Spar-
row, 2017), Robert Sparrow (2020) disagrees and proposes 
a modification of the virtue argument. According to him, 
robots may enable vice but not virtue. He expresses the intui-
tion that “kindness” to a robot is itself not genuine kindness’ 
and asserts: ‘I am much more willing to criticize behaviour 
towards robots than I am to praise it. Indeed, it is not clear 
to me that I would ever be inclined to praise someone on the 
basis of the way they treat robots.’ (Sparrow, 2020).
Sparrow offers two arguments that are meant to account 
for these intuitions about an asymmetry between virtue and 
vice when it comes to apply virtue ethics to robots. Both 
concern fundamental issues for virtue ethics. The first is 
that ‘we are swifter to condemn vice than we are to praise 
virtue.’ He suggests that when it comes to virtue, we do not 
tend to appreciate attempts at being good so much, whereas 
we are quick to condemn any attempt at vice. This is an 
interesting observation that would explain why most of the 
current discussions in this area focus on the creation of vice 
in human–robot interaction: this argument is meant to reflect 
a tendency that is supposed to be present in the moral life 
more generally.
The second argument is that for the agent to be virtuous, 
the agent has to have beliefs that represent how the world 
is. For Aristotle, all exercise of virtue requires the exercise 
of practical wisdom, and this practical wisdom requires 
knowledge of the nature of the good life and understanding 
of how the world works. Sparrow endorses this view and 
claims that virtues are oriented towards action (this is part 
of his agent-based orientation – see below) and are oriented 
towards the world. Yet he then makes an additional claim: 
while lack of such knowledge is no barrier to the exercise 
of vices, it is a barrier to virtue. We can be vicious without 
having the adequate knowledge, but for the exercise of vir-
tue we need it. According to Sparrow, this introduces an 
asymmetry with regard to virtue and vice: whereas being 
cruel to robots is a problem for vice, being kind to a robot 
does not lead to virtue, since it is not a genuine kindness. 
Robots do not feel anything and kindness towards robots 
does not realize the goals towards that kindness is oriented. 
Robots are not an appropriate object of kindness. Therefore, 
he concludes, people cannot demonstrate real kindness by 
being kind to robots. (Sparrow, 2020) (The only exception, 
Sparrow recognizes, is when a person genuinely mistakes 
the robot for something that is an appropriate object of kind-
ness. Then this could be actual kindness and be virtuous.) 
Sparrow’s argument involves the assumption that it matters 
for virtue to represent the world accurately or, to put it in a 
different way, to hold true beliefs about the world, since ‘vir-
tue requires practical wisdom and practical wisdom requires 
that we direct our kindness to creatures who might actually 
benefit from it.’
This argument supports Sparrow’s intuitions. It also leans 
on a long tradition in virtue ethics that stresses both the 
importance of practical wisdom (based on Aristotle) and 
sensitivity to moral needs that exist in one’s environment. 
Against Plato, Aristotle stressed that we do not so much 
need theoretical (episteme) but rather practical knowledge 
(phronesis) and the training of virtuous conduct. Sparrow 
interprets this practical knowledge as requiring knowledge 
of the world, and seems to combines this with a Platonic/
Socratic intuition that virtue should be about reality, not 
illusion: he would agree with Plato/Socrates that conduct 
that is rooted in deception must be avoided. As Carr puts it: 
‘for Socrates and Plato, the chief route to virtue is accurate 
perception of the world, ourselves and our relations with 
others and the moral wisdom of virtue requires knowledge 
of objective truth that frees us from the bonds of ignorance 
and deception.’ (Carr, 2020: 1382) This is the philosophical 
tradition that forms the background of his arguments.
In this paper, I will not present an extensive engagement 
with that philosophical tradition and work, but rather focus 
on critically examining Sparrow’s arguments concerning the 
asymmetry of virtue and vice as applied to human–robot 
interaction. Yet discussions such as these are important 
since, as Sparrow notes at the end of his paper, they consti-
tute not only contributions to robot ethics but also to think-
ing about virtue, ethics, and the good life more generally. 
With this purpose in mind, I submit the following critical 
comments and objections.
Critical discussion of Sparrow’s arguments 
for asymmetry
A different normative intuition: people should 
praise kindness and virtue more than they do now
Sparrow’s first argument amounts to an empirical observa-
tion about how humans evaluate virtue and vice. To sup-
port this argument would require more evidence. One may 
also wonder if in the future, when human–robot interaction 
might be more common and robots more advanced, our 
moral intuitions will change. But let us assume that that what 
Sparrow says is true: we tend to focus more on vice than on 
virtue. Then in response one could employ the descriptive/
normative distinction and argue that whatever people do, 
what counts for normative virtue ethics is how people should 
behave when it comes to evaluating each other’s behav-
iour. In this case, one could say: it may well be that we are 
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quick to condemn vice and not so swiftly praise virtue and 
attempts at virtue, but this is wrong. People should be more 
symmetrical when it comes to evaluating people in terms of 
virtue and vice. When, people are kind towards robots (or 
display kindness in any other way for that matter), others 
should do more to praise that kindness and not focus on vice 
alone. Moreover, one could assert that robots can help us in 
training kindness and if people tend to not praise that kind-
ness and only respond with moral indignation when robots 
are abused, then this is a problem and it is their problem. 
It is a problem since, although this tells us a lot about how 
we actually deal with virtue and vice (as Sparrow shows), 
this way of asymmetrically dealing with virtue and vice is 
wrong. And it is their problem since, regardless of other 
people’s evaluation, the person exercising kindness towards 
robots is on track towards virtue. It would be desirable if 
people worked harder to praise virtue in others, since this 
would better support the training of virtue. But independent 
of this evaluation, one could claim that robots actually create 
habits that lead to virtue.
Even vicious persons need some knowledge 
of the world, vice needs to be intentional, and one 
can use robots to achieve ethical goals
Yet Sparrow could then offer his second argument, based 
on an interpretation of practical wisdom in terms of being 
responsive to reality. But there are at least two gaps in that 
argument. First, one could agree with his definition of practi-
cal wisdom, but disagree that this introduces an asymmetry. 
One could argue, against Sparrow, that lack of knowledge 
is not only a barrier to virtue but also to vice. If vice is 
understood as the result of a bad kind of habituation that 
involves doing something deliberately wrong repeatedly, it 
also requires knowledge of the world and the object of harm, 
since otherwise the person would not know how to execute 
the deliberate and intentional wrongdoing. If knowledge and 
awareness of the object and the world is so important as 
Sparrow and Aristotle claim, then it also seems necessary 
for vice. Both virtue and vice require that part of practi-
cal wisdom which, since Aristotle, is seen as being about 
knowledge with regard to means and ends and about inten-
tion. They also require knowledge of the good life, even in 
the case of vice, since the person who is aware that she is 
training and practicing vice has to know why what she is 
doing is not good. Vice must be understood as intentional. 
And if vice is understood as unintentional mishabituation, 
then probably it is not vicious in the first place, since the 
person did not know that she was doing something wrong. 
Sparrow’s exception shows that he might accept this, since 
if he thinks that virtue may arise from a situation in which 
the person who “abuses” a robot but could not possibly have 
known that the dog was a robot dog instead of a real dog, he 
may also accept that the person who did not know that she 
was training vice is also excused.
Second, one could accept that knowledge of the world 
and being directed to the right kinds of goals is a neces-
sary condition for the development of virtue, but deny that 
this implies that one cannot train virtue by being tempo-
rarily directed at a goal that supports the habituation with-
out reaching the goal yet. Taking into account the tempo-
ral dimension, one could argue that a person could create 
a habituation of (expressing) kindness in the human–robot 
interaction at time t1 with the goal of being (really) kind 
to humans at time t2. This would not commit anyone to 
claim that the first kind of kindness is real; it would only 
require similarity and simulation. Moreover, if this is done 
on purpose, it would correspond to the very goal-directed 
behaviour of the kind Sparrow and Aristotle praise, and 
would require knowledge of how to deal with the world in 
the sense that one has to know how to create habituation 
through simulation. This would at least support the claim 
that we can train virtue with robots by means of simulation 
if we are aware that we are doing so.
Furthermore, if it is true that vice also requires some sort 
of practical wisdom, then Sparrows’ claim that ‘our fanta-
sies about immoral behaviour can make us vicious but our 
dreams of virtue cannot make us virtuous’ is problematic 
since the statement implies that vice can be based on fantasy 
rather than real knowledge of the world. Sparrow’s only way 
out is then to deny that vice requires practical wisdom, but 
as I argued this claim seems implausible.
How much reality or illusion is needed for it to be 
a barrier to virtue?
It is also questionable how much false beliefs, illusions, 
and ‘fantasies’ must be in place for Sparrow or any other 
evaluator (evaluating the interaction from a third person 
point of view) to conclude that virtue is not trained in 
a particular human–robot interaction. It could be, for 
instance, that the person has one false belief about the 
robot’s abilities (e.g. the belief that the robot is intelli-
gent, whereas in fact it is remote controlled) but in gen-
eral believes that the robot is a machine and not a person. 
If Sparrow’s formulation of the reality requirement is 
right, then it seems impossible for virtue ethicists to make 
any claim about virtue that could arise from relationships 
to non-humans when there is even the suspicion that a 
false belief is at play. This seems a too high price to pay. 
If Sparrow were right, then we would have to accept, for 
instance, that vice arises from treating animals badly, but 
that no virtue arises from treating them kindly if the per-
son involved has just one false belief about them. Sparrow 
therefore would need to qualify the reality requirement: 
perhaps he means only one kind of beliefs, for example 
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beliefs about the ontological status of the robot, or he 
means that there needs to be a very high degree of illusion 
(many false beliefs) for them to be a barrier to virtue. Per-
haps we need a more sophisticated view. For example, one 
could argue that if an agent has a kind disposition towards 
others and happens to hold a false belief at one moment or 
even with regard to one particular state of the world, this 
epistemic failure to represent the world accurately does 
not render the general disposition of kindness any less 
good and does not necessarily touch the development and 
flourishing of virtue. Some kinds of knowledge might be 
necessary or more conducive to the training of virtue in 
a particular interaction and situation than others. Even if 
one accepts Sparrow’s point that beliefs about the world 
matter to virtue, one could claim that they do not always 
and not necessarily matter for virtue. More generally, 
ignorance about the world—seen as a barrier to virtue by 
Sparrow—needs to be defined more precisely.
Sparrow could reply that the kinds of knowledge and 
beliefs that are necessary for virtue are those that are 
involved in justifying the action. For example, a person 
may be kind to a robot and justify this by saying that the 
robot is a person, but this is a false belief, and therefore 
there is no virtue in this according to Sparrow. Now this 
is a justification that concerns the ontological status of 
the robot. But what if the person uses an entirely differ-
ent kind of belief to justify the action, for example the 
belief that “kindness leads to more kindness.” Whether 
or not this is true, would this belief matter to the ques-
tion regarding virtue as much as the other belief? And 
if it were false (and how would one know, and who will 
be the judge of that?), would it be as much a barrier to 
virtue as the first belief? If one accepts Sparrow’s point 
that beliefs about the world matter for virtue, could it be 
that some kinds of ignorance are more problematic than 
others with regard to virtue or vice? The relation between 
virtue/vice and knowledge may be very complex; with his 
claim concerning beliefs about the world, Sparrow enters 
a difficult terrain.
Note that these epistemological challenges are not just 
a problem for virtue ethics; other normative theories also 
face them. For example, consequentialism needs an accu-
rate account of consequences. The general question is 
how demanding we want to be, epistemologically speak-
ing, with regard to the epistemological criteria that are 
inevitably linked to our normative theories. Clearly, we 
need the relevant knowledge for any ethical evaluation, 
and which and how much knowledge remains an open 
question. But my intuition is that if we raise the bar to 
high, we risk to have an account that does not work in 
the real world. Adding an epistemological condition as 
formulated by Sparrow is risky in that sense.
Virtue and consequences
Talking about risks: Sparrow is well aware that virtue eth-
ics arguments can be interpreted as consequentialist and 
behaviourist claims about how robots shape our behaviour 
towards people and animals. Seen from a virtue ethics per-
spective, this interpretation is seen as misleading and wrong. 
More specifically, Sparrow uses an agent-based version of 
virtue ethics. According to agent-based virtue ethics, the 
ethical status of an act depends entirely on the ‘motives, 
character traits, or individuals’ (Slote, 1995: 83)—not on 
the consequences. A particular action counts as virtue or 
vice, regardless of the consequences. But the very possi-
bility of this interpretation also reveals another unresolved 
problem and discussion within Sparrow’s paper and within 
virtue ethics in general: to what extent does virtue depend 
on consequences? Here is an argument based on my own 
intuitions about this. One could disagree with Sparrow and 
the agent-based account, without buying into a full-fledged 
consequentialism or behaviourism, and argue that conse-
quences matter for virtue, albeit not the only thing that mat-
ter. If virtue has no consequences in the real world, then 
it seems that it renders virtue morally irrelevant. Having a 
virtuous moral character seems to mean very little indeed 
if it doesn’t have consequences. Imagine a totally isolated 
agent, who cannot produce any consequences in the world. 
Would we believe that this agent is virtuous, if someone said 
so? Would it even make sense to say that this agent has “a 
virtuous character”? We would not know, unless we had an 
account of actual consequences (e.g., in the form of a nar-
rative). Therefore, the evaluation of virtue and vice should 
not only be based on traits of the agent. According to this 
view, kindness is only a virtue and a person is only kind if 
this virtue and trait has consequences, whatever else may be 
required. In the case at hand and contra his subscription to 
agent-based virtue ethics, Sparrow would have to concede 
that the consequences of kindness towards a person should 
matter, since this seems to be an assumption in the argument 
that kindness towards robots is not directed to any reality or 
real need on the part of the robot. Sparrow’s idea seems to 
be that our virtue and kindness should have consequences 
for the receiver of the virtue or kindness; otherwise it is not 
real kindness. But if we admit this and say that virtue is also 
about consequences, then it seems to undermine the very 
strength of the virtue ethics argument: one of the purposes of 
using a virtue ethics argument was to make us not dependent 
on a consequentialist argument. Sparrow’s point was to say 
that kicking a robot is bad, regardless of the consequences 
for the robot or even for other humans. His emphasis was on 
moral character of the human agent. This was in line with 
the agent-based approach. Now one could try to solve the 
problem by focusing on the notions of disposition and habit, 
both of which may or may not be consequential. It is then 
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sufficient to have a virtuous disposition and habit, but with-
out the requirement that this always and necessarily leads to 
the relevant consequences. With regard to robots, this would 
mean arguing that being kind to a robot creates a virtuous 
disposition and habit, regardless of the actual consequence 
and indeed regardless of any reality requirement. Sparrow, 
however, would then add his point about real kindness.
The reality issue: first responses
Any assessment of Sparrow’s argument will depend on how 
one deals with the reality issue, that is, on the claim that 
when one is kind to a robot this is not real kindness because 
(so it is assumed) the robot is just a machine, and we can-
not develop genuine kindness to a machine. According to 
Sparrow, for virtue it matters how the world is. It is not the 
only thing that matters, perhaps, but seeing the world as it is 
constitutes a necessary condition for the development of vir-
tue. Now I see at least five possible ways to respond to this:
First, one could accept the claim that “kindness” towards 
robots is not real, genuine kindness and that there is no cor-
rect representation of the world in that case, but dispute 
Sparrow’s claim that this matters for virtue. One could argue 
that virtue is solely based on the person’s character or dis-
position, or that it depends on character and consequences, 
but that it does not require any correct representation of the 
world. This would go against Sparrow’s intuition but it is an 
option for those who do not share that intuition.
Second, one could also accept that there is no genuine 
kindness and reality in this human-robot interaction, but 
claim that it is possible to train and simulate the exercise of 
virtue towards robots and imitate kindness in such a context 
in order to develop real kindness. Whether or not this works 
depends on whether one accepts the following premises: (a) 
we can make a strict distinction between training/simulation 
and the actual exercise of virtue, and (b) bringing in the time 
dimension again, we can imitate kindness in a way that does 
not make it real at that moment but leads to real kindness 
at another, later moment in time. My intuition is that both 
premises are problematic. If we really do the same actions as 
we do in the actual or real exercise of virtue and repeat these 
actions, why would they not lead to virtue in the “training” 
case? A training would not be a training if there was only lit-
tle similarity to the real thing. If virtue is like a skill, a com-
mon idea in virtue ethics (e.g., Annas, 2008), then we can 
compare with the training of (other) skills and consider for 
instance the case of pilot training: in such cases we accept 
that these skills can be trained in a safe, non-consequential 
and simulated environment that is virtual, not real, and that 
this nevertheless leads to the development of real skills 
that can be used in the “real world”. And if, as agent-based 
accounts say, some actions lead to virtue whereas others lead 
to vice, then does the virtual environment make a difference 
to the nature and quality of the action? Is it the same action, 
or merely a similar action because it takes place in a virtual 
environment? And does this matter for virtue?
Third, however, to hold on to the reality requirement 
may be construed as saying that what happens in the one 
environment is not real, whereas what happens in another 
environment is real. But this is wrong. It is not entirely clear 
if Sparrow would subscribe to this. But if he does, a third 
possible response to Sparrow is to deny that the virtue and 
feeling of kindness, as exercises towards the robot, is not 
real. We could claim that, just as the pilot is really training 
flying an airplane when she is in a simulator, the person who 
is kind to a robot is really training kindness. If we accept 
that everything that goes on here is real and that therefore 
in both cases the conditions for both virtue and vice are in 
place, then there is a symmetry with regard to virtue and 
vice. This option is especially attractive one once we adopt 
a different, non-realist metaphysics and epistemology, which 
approaches the question regarding the real in an entirely dif-
ferent way (see below).
A fourth response to the reality issue is to argue neither 
against nor for the reality of the kindness in question, but to 
say that we do not know or at least do not always know if it 
is real or not, or that we cannot know that it is real or not. 
This epistemological issue is a problem for Sparrow’s view, 
since it includes the view that an accurate view of the world 
is necessary for virtue. But it is a problem to be reckoned 
with in general. When we observe a person who is seemingly 
exercising kindness towards a robot, how do we know that it 
is genuine kindness? Sparrow’s argument assumes that we 
know this and that we can know this. But we might not be 
sure. And it also seems to be a problem for virtue ethics in 
general: How do we identify whether or not virtue or vice is 
present? Drawing on an agent-based account, one could say 
that some actions are always virtuous whereas other actions 
always constitute vice. But how do we know this?
This leads us to a fifth kind of question: who decides what 
is reality? Is it the philosopher? The user? The developer? 
The robot companies? The question about reality and knowl-
edge can not only be understood as an epistemological but 
also as a political issue (see also below). For example, robot-
ics companies will try to sell their robot to consumers as a 
“companion”, a “friend”, and so on. They try to persuade 
consumers to (literally) buy into their representation of real-
ity. Others may contest this and evoke their view of reality 
(e.g., the belief that the robot is just a machine.) It should 
not be assumed that all of us always agree what reality is in a 
particular case. Looking at the phenomena through a critical 
and political lens draws attention to what we may call the 
political epistemology of robotics.
However, one could object that at least some of these 
responses assume that what Sparrow is saying is that the 
behaviour of the person and what is happening is not real. 
 M. Coeckelbergh 
1 3
My reading is indeed based on what Sparrow’s repeated 
view that kindness towards robots is not real kindness, and 
I interpreted that “kindness” as not just meaning a dispo-
sition but also the exercise of that disposition, including 
behaviour that can be interpreted as “kind.” Now Spar-
row would likely disagree with this interpretation and 
could reply that (1) he did not define kindness in terms of 
behaviour and (2) that his point about unreality is not that 
the behaviour or what is happening in the human–robot 
interaction is unreal, but that there is no response to appro-
priately perceived state of the recipient. In other words, 
Sparrow could agree that the human–robot interaction is 
real, but say that there is no accurate perception of the 
needs of the other person. Let me respond to this. First 
(and in analogy to my point about consequences), if virtue 
does not result from, or arises from, virtuous behaviour at 
all, is it still virtue? My intuition is that virtue without any 
behavioural component, not even at the stage of habitua-
tion and learning, is not virtue. In so far as Sparrow orients 
his virtue ethics towards actions, he may agree—although 
the term “actions” is then better than “behaviour,” which 
may suggest behaviourism. Second, this focus on the oth-
ers’ needs would shift the centre of moral significance 
again to the recipient of virtue, and not to the virtuous 
person, which is an uneasy thing to say for anyone in the 
virtue ethics tradition who focuses on agents and what they 
do. While, as Slote points out, agent-based is not neces-
sarily agent-focused, to put a lot of weight on the recipient 
of virtue is at least in tension with agent-based accounts 
and with most of the virtue ethics tradition. Now Sparrow 
could say that the moral consideration is directed to the 
recipient, but based in the agent. However, this still begs 
the question regarding the recipient’s properties and stand-
ing, whereas one of the main reasons for using a virtue 
ethics approach was to not have to worry about the moral 
standing of the robot and its properties. Talking about the 
needs of the robot brings this back.
Furthermore, to shift the focus to the (real) needs of the 
recipient also raises again the political question: who gets to 
say which those demands are? Consider histories of exclu-
sion and oppression in which white adult men denied rights 
to women, non-white people, children, and non-human 
animals, who were perceived and asserted to have less or 
different needs. While at first sight it might seem fine to 
appeal to the “reality” of the needs of the receiver of virtue, 
who defines that reality, and what if our views change? Can 
we therefore confidently assert that robots have no intrin-
sic moral standing, whereas the virtuous or vicious moral 
agent has, in the light of this history (and, to some extent 
unfortunately, this present)? It seems that we should at least 
entertain or leave room for the possibility that we may well 
be wrong about the moral standing of others. A virtue ethics 
such as the one proposed by Sparrow risks to close off that 
possibility if it does not address this issue. This also brings 
us to the next point: anthropocentrism.
Risk of anthropocentrism
There is a risk of anthropocentric bias in Sparrow’s argu-
ments, at least if in so far as they assume that only rela-
tions between humans can lend themselves to the exercise 
of “genuine” kindness. I formulate this in terms of risk, 
since it is not clear from the paper if Sparrow adheres to 
this view. From Sparrow’s remarks about animals, which 
put ‘people and animals’ in the same category, it is clear 
that he thinks that virtue ethics applies to both humans and 
animals. But it is not clear why he excludes robots. Spar-
row could argue that they lack certain properties humans 
and animals have. But this was the kind of argument that 
virtue ethics tried to avoid. It turns out, therefore, that Spar-
row uses two measures: one for robots (traditional argu-
ments about human standing that concern the property of 
the entity) and virtue ethics for humans and animals (here 
the properties of the humans and animals are not relevant 
initially, the focus is on virtue of the humans, and properties 
only enter via the backdoor once the question concerning 
knowledge of the world and reality is asked.) This use of 
two measures could be interpreted as constituting anthropo-
centric bias and unfairness. Moreover, virtue ethics as it is 
traditionally conceived and also applied by Sparrow, focuses 
on the virtue of humans. Whether other beings could have 
virtue is not even questioned. This ignores the literature on 
this topic. For instance, in previous work (2012b) I have 
argued that robots could be perceived as virtuous, having 
‘virtual virtue’, and Gamez et al. (2020) have considered 
the possibility of attributing virtue or vice can be attributed 
to machines. Gunkel (2018) even considers robots as ‘oth-
ers’ and offers a Levinasian view which seems very differ-
ent from virtue ethics. How would these views change the 
problem as defined by Sparrow? I do not wish to defend 
these particular views here but just want to point to Spar-
row’s assumption that only humans can be virtuous. One 
could at least consider the question regarding the virtue and 
flourishing of non-humans. Sparrow could offer at least two 
replies. First, he could point out that he considers animals 
(as is clear from the article), but claim that robots lack the 
properties for moral patiency (and say that this is the correct 
representation of the world). But one may question this very 
procedure: humans deciding about the status of non-humans 
already sets up a hierarchical relation between humans and 
non-humans. (Coeckelbergh, 2012a) Moreover, this leads 
the discussion back to what virtue ethics wanted to avoid: a 
discussion about moral standing in terms of intrinsic prop-
erties. Second, Sparrow could therefore insist that virtue 
ethics can evaluate actions towards non-humans such as 
robots without being committed to any claim about these 
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non-humans. Virtue ethics focuses on the character and/or 
the actions of the virtue agent, not the virtue patient. But 
on relational and Levinasian views such as those defended 
by Coeckelbergh and Gunkel, this can be seen as a problem 
rather than a solution: to center one’s ethics on agents and 
their actions, rather than relations and moral patients, is then 
seen as itself morally problematic.
The reality issue: realism and its critics
Finally, in so far as Sparrow makes claims about truth and 
reality and needs these for his argument to work, we need 
to further examine the epistemological and metaphysical 
presuppositions of these arguments. I already presented 
some responses to “the reality issue,” but this discussion 
can be deepened by considering critical responses to realism. 
Sparrow seems to assume a realist view, which is focused 
on true and objective facts about things, for example when 
he claims that the reality of the robot does not enable the 
exercise of virtue, and when he suggests we need to exer-
cise real kindness (kindness towards people). But there are 
other approaches, such as antirealist or constructivist ones, 
for example in Wittgensteinian thinking and in the relational 
approach to robot ethics used by Coeckelbergh (2011, 2012a, 
2014). One could object to Sparrow’s realism that what con-
stitutes the reality of the kindness and the reality of the robot 
cannot be known independently of the language we use to 
performatively shape what this robot “is” and how we con-
struct kindness in a social context. Sparrow assumes that 
we can have a neutral, objective view of what the world is 
(e.g. one which says that robots are things like toasters, to 
which we cannot be kind let alone exercise virtue with), 
independent of linguistic and social construction; but such 
an approach can and has been questioned—also with regard 
to robots (Coeckelbergh, 2011). He seems to assume a god’s 
eye point of view from which we can judge whether what 
happens in the human–robot interaction and elsewhere con-
stitutes a genuine exercise of kindness and training of virtue. 
But before we can take such a position (if we can at all), the 
interaction and the situation are already framed in particular 
ways, for example in ways that exclude the robot from moral 
consideration or in ways that define kindness as something 
that can only be exercised towards humans and animals.
Note that social constructivism and related directions 
of thought that approach epistemological questions from a 
social and political point of view (for example Foucault, 
1980) could also be used to ask: who determines what is 
kindness or viciousness? Who is that third person, for exam-
ple, who determines whether it is right for me to feel kind-
ness towards a robot or whether my kindness is “genuine”? 
Who decides whether or not someone is (becoming more) 
virtuous when that person habitually talks to plants, strokes 
robots, or loves animals? What are the power relations and 
social interests that are at play here? These questions lead 
us to the politics of human–robot interaction and indeed the 
politics of (applied) virtue ethics; they are not only relevant 
in the context of this discussion of Sparrow’s argument.
Brief conclusion
I have presented a discussion of some objections to Spar-
row’s argument concerning asymmetry between virtue and 
vice with regard to what we do to robots, touching upon key 
problems for anyone who wishes to apply virtue ethics the-
ory to the moral standing of robots and other non-humans: 
the question how much we should praise virtue as opposed 
to vice, practical knowledge and wisdom, how much illusion 
there should be to be a barrier to virtue and more gener-
ally the relation between knowledge and virtue, the relation 
between virtue and consequences, the moral relevance of the 
reality requirement and the different ways one can deal with 
it, the risk of anthropocentric bias, and the metaphysical, 
epistemological, and indeed political assumptions underpin-
ning arguments in this area. Yet these issues are not only 
faced by people working in robot ethics: Sparrow and I agree 
that these are key challenges for any philosophical discus-
sion about virtue and the good life.
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